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Abstract
Grapheme–color synesthesia is a condition in which objectively achromatic graphemes induce
concurrent color experiences. While it was long thought that the colors emerge during
perception, there is growing support for the view that colors are integral to synesthetes’
cognitive representations of graphemes. In this work, we review evidence for two opposing
theories positing either a perceptual or cognitive origin of concurrent colors: the cross-
activation theory and the conceptual-mediation model. The review covers results on inducer
and concurrent color processing as well as findings concerning the brain structure and
grapheme–color mappings in synesthetes and trained mappings in nonsynesthetes. The results
support different aspects of both theories. Finally, we discuss how research on memory colors
could provide a new perspective in the debate about the level of processing at which the
synesthetic colors occur.
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Introduction
Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which a stimulus (inducer) elicits an additional, unstimulated
experience (concurrent; Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). One of the most common forms is
grapheme–color synesthesia in which the experience of a grapheme is accompanied by the
experience of color. These color concurrents arise automatically and cannot be voluntarily
controlled (for an overview, see Mattingley, 2009; Rich, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005).
The inducer–concurrent combinations vary across individuals but remain stable over time
(Ward, 2013; cf. Simner, Ipser, Smees, & Alvarez, 2017).
Current prevalence rates for synesthesia range from 0.08% estimated from responses to a
newspaper article on synesthesia (Rich et al., 2005), to 4.4% based on experimental data in
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large-scale samples (Simner et al., 2006). For the grapheme–color subtype, the results of recent
studies broadly converge on a prevalence rate around 1% (Carmichael, Down, Shillcock,
Eagleman, & Simner, 2015; Watson et al., 2017). Since a large proportion of synesthesia
research is about the grapheme–color experience, our review focuses on this subtype.
Synesthesia can be diagnosed with diﬀerent established tests. A color-picker task (e.g.,
Eagleman, Kagan, Nelson, Sagaram, & Sarma, 2007) determines the variability of the color
matches selected for speciﬁc graphemes in multiple randomized trials. The resulting color
variation score is the average Euclidean distance of the color coordinates in RGB color space.
Synesthetes demonstrate a characteristically low variability and achieve low color variation
scores. Nonsynesthetes, on the other hand, have diﬃculties to select the same color for a
given grapheme across trials and produce high variation scores. The outcome of the color
picker test can be validated in a speeded congruency task (Eagleman et al., 2007) in which
participants need to quickly decide whether the print color of a grapheme is congruent or
incongruent to the concurrent. Synesthetes typically respond faster and more accurately than
nonsynesthetes. Finally, questionnaires can be used to assess the quality of the color
experience in synesthetes (Barnett & Newell, 2008; Hossain, Simner, & Ipser, 2017).
However, as of today, Eagleman’s (2007) synesthesia battery seems to be the most
widespread and the only validated diagnostic test (Carmichael et al., 2015).
The current knowledge on synesthetic experiences does not only rely on subjective reports
but also on experiments demonstrating a behavioral eﬀect of synesthetic colors. For instance,
multiple studies show a synesthetic Stroop eﬀect. In the synesthetic Stroop task (Wollen &
Ruggerio, 1983), the inducers are printed in a color congruent, incongruent, or neutral with
respect to the induced color. The pattern of results is similar to that of a classical Stroop task
(naming the print color of a color word, e.g., the word ‘blue’ printed in red; MacLeod, 1991)
with higher reaction times on incongruent trials due to a response conﬂict (Dixon, Smilek, &
Merikle, 2004; Nikolic´, Lichti, & Singer, 2007; Ward, Li, Salih, & Sagiv, 2007).
Despite the evidence of synesthesia being a genuine phenomenon, it is still unclear how
inducers and concurrents are processed to generate this experience. Here, we review ﬁndings
in regard to two prominent and well-elaborated models with opposing positions in current
synesthesia research and propose a future research perspective.
Two Current Theories on Synesthesia
Grapheme–color synesthesia is an example of involuntary nonretinal vision (Pearson &
Westbrook, 2015): The color experience does not correspond to the spectral properties of
the inducer and associated activity in wavelength-tuned photoreceptors. Thus, a central
concern in synesthesia research is how the color experience emerges. Diﬀerent authors
would place the critical event on diﬀerent levels of the processing hierarchy from sensory
registration to object recognition and related semantic operations. Accordingly, models of
synesthesia have been characterized based on the time course of activation (early or late;
Brang, Hubbard, Coulson, Huang, & Ramachandran, 2010; Volberg, Karmann, Birkner, &
Greenlee, 2013) or by the processing level (low or high; Janik McErlean & Banissy, 2017;
Mroczko-Wasowicz & Nikolic´, 2014).
In this section, we will focus on two models that could be considered as two ends of the
continuum from low- to high-level explanations of the origin of synesthetic colors: the cross-
activation theory (Hubbard, Brang, & Ramachandran, 2011) and the conceptual-mediation
model (Chiou & Rich, 2014). The former model posits that synesthesia arises during sensory
processing due to an irregular activation of neurons encoding the concurrent feature.
The latter model suggests that colors are part of the object knowledge that is linked to the
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conceptual representation of the grapheme. Synesthetic colors would then arise through
memory retrieval not perceptual processes.
One major model that will not be examined in detail is the disinhibited-feedback model
(Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). It resembles the cross-activation theory in that synesthetic
color experiences involve irregular activity in color coding neurons but assumes a diﬀerent
propagation of neural activation from the inducer to the concurrent pathway. Thus, it can be
regarded as a similar position to that of the cross-activation theory.
Cross-Activation Theory
The cross-activation theory is a low-level model that speciﬁcally addresses grapheme–color
synesthesia. Accordingly, the focus is on brain areas that are associated with the feature
analysis of graphemes and colors (Hubbard et al., 2011; Ramachandran & Hubbard,
2001). The pertinent brain site for grapheme processing is the visual word form area
(VWFA; McCandliss, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2003; see Grotheer, Ambrus, & Kova´cs, 2016
for an analogous number form area). The VWFA is known to be active during reading
and is thought to support the translation of physical grapheme shapes into letter and word
meaning. Adjacent to the VWFA in the posterior occipito-temporal cortex lies the visual area
4 (V4). The majority of V4 neurons are color selective (Roe et al., 2012), and lesions in that
area produce a loss of color vision in humans (Bartolomeo, Bachoud-Le´vi, & Thiebaut de
Schotten, 2014). Thus, V4 can be characterized as a color-processing area.
According to the cross-activation theory, synesthesia is a neurological condition with increased
neural cross-wiring between V4 and VWFA. As a consequence, a neural representation of a
grapheme in VWFA would automatically entail a representation of color in V4 and generate
the percept of a colored grapheme. Thus, proponents of the cross-activation theory believe that
synesthetic experiences emerge from a unique neuroanatomical characteristic of the synesthetes’
brains. Moreover, they assume that synesthesia emerges at the earliest representational levels of
grapheme and color processing.
Since the original publication, two modiﬁcations have been made on the cross-activation
theory. First, it was acknowledged that distributed representations of grapheme shape and
color must be integrated in order to generate a uniﬁed percept of a colored grapheme (Hubbard
et al., 2011). As in normal vision, the integration would involve activity in parietal cortex that
has a common spatial reference map for unisensory feature representations (Robertson, 2003).
Second, in response to new developments in the research of grapheme processing, letter
recognition is no longer seen as a result of template matching but as an incremental analysis
of the features that make up the grapheme. Thus, the color inducing entity might not be the
grapheme itself but rather a feature thereof (cascaded cross-tuning model; Brang et al., 2010;
Hubbard et al., 2011). In sum, in the revised version of the cross-activation theory grapheme
processing relies on feature analysis, and the conscious perception of the colored grapheme
relies on feature binding. However, early stage cross-activation is still stated as the essential ﬁrst
step of atypical color experiences in synesthetes (Hubbard et al., 2011).
Conceptual-Mediation Model
Contrary to low-level explanations of synesthetic experiences, high-level conceptual theories focus
on the associative aspects of inducers as triggering factors for the concurrent. These theories are
unspeciﬁc with respect to the inducer or concurrent modalities, and can thus explain perceptual
inducers that rely on sensory events, for example, seeing written graphemes or hearing sounds, as
well as conceptual inducers that do not (Mroczko-Wasowicz & Nikolic´, 2014).
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The conceptual-mediation model of synesthesia by Chiou and Rich (2014) is based on a
model of object knowledge (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers,
2007). It proposes that the color activation in grapheme–color synesthesia relies on cognitive
rather than sensory representations of the inducer and the concurrent. Accordingly, both
synesthetes and nonsynesthetes would process a grapheme alike until a conceptual
representation is activated. While in both groups, the grapheme representation is the
center of a semantic network (‘‘hub’’) with many attributes (‘‘spokes,’’ e.g., lexical and
phonetic information for graphemes), synesthetes also have a spoke for the typical color of
this grapheme. Thus, synesthetic colors are stored within a semantic network as memory
colors for grapheme objects (Chiou & Rich, 2014).
Based on previous work on object knowledge representation, Chiou and Rich (2014)
suggest that the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) is the central hub that integrates the
concept of the grapheme. When the grapheme concept is accessed, its semantic network is
activated in the ATL. Depending on the actual spokes, the ATL might activate a concurrent
color representation in V4 but also in higher brain areas where color knowledge is
represented. The spread of activation within the concurrent processing network would
then aﬀect the strength of the synesthetic experience (i.e., seeing or feeling the synesthetic
color). Damage or disruption of ATL function would impede the color coactivation and
erase the synesthetic experience.
Theoretical Predictions
To interpret experimental results for or against the existing theories, it is important to clarify
what these theories predict. We organize the predictions, as well as the review of empirical
results, as follows. The ‘‘Predictions Regarding Inducers’’ section focuses on inducers and the
conditions under which graphemes produce color experiences in synesthetes. In the next
section, we turn our attention to the concurrent, and whether synesthetic color experiences
are similar to real color sensations. In the following section, we discuss diﬀerences between
synesthetes and nonsynesthetes in neural structure and function speciﬁcally predicted by one of
the reviewed theories. Finally, we address the question of whether there are canonical mappings
between graphemes and colors. In doing so, we proceed from cognitive or perceptual functions
to synesthetic individuals and to synesthetic mappings across individuals while concentrating
on the two competing theories on synesthesia. In this respect, we oﬀer a diﬀerent perspective
from that of recent review that mainly focused on color processing in synesthetes (Janik
McErlean & Banissy, 2017).
Predictions Regarding Inducers
Graphemes are a special class of objects with distinct visual features like lines, curves, angles,
and proportions. Simultaneously, as lexical symbols, they also contain abstract information,
for example, the magnitude of numerals or the use of letters in language. Hence, we
diﬀerentiate between the early perceptual representation of visual features and the late
conceptual representation of abstract information about the identiﬁed graphemic object.
If synesthetic colors are directly coactivated through neural connections with grapheme-
processing areas, then the synesthetic experience should depend on low-level physical
properties of the inducer, for example, angle or global shape (possibly depending on font
and size) of a letter, and presentation modality, for example, written versus spoken.
Furthermore, the inducer must be physically present so that its features can be processed
on a perceptual level. If features of graphemes lead to synesthetic experiences, this should also
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apply to letter-like objects (fake letters) with similar features. Conscious recognition of a
grapheme, on the other hand, should not be essential for the concurrent to arise.
Accordingly, manipulations of attention modulating conscious access to the inducer
should have little impact on the synesthetic experience.
In contrast, according to high-level theories like the conceptual-mediation model, the physical
form of the inducer should not be critical for the concurrent color sensation. An inducer does not
even need to be physically present if its concept is activated. The synesthetic experience depends
on the conceptual processing of the inducer, including its conscious identiﬁcation (prior to the
synesthetic experience). Since attention is important to consciously perceive a stimulus, it is likely
to modulate the experience of a concurrent color.
Predictions Regarding Concurrent Colors
Proponents of the cross-activation theory view the synesthetic experience as a perceptual
phenomenon. If the color is coactivated during bottom-up processing, then synesthetic
colors should be similar to real colors. That is, achromatic inducers should produce the
same experiences and behavioral eﬀects in synesthetes as chromatic graphemes do in
nonsynesthetes. Further, color-processing areas like V4 should be active in response to
achromatic inducers, and this activity should occur early during inducer processing, almost
simultaneously to activity in the VWFA.
The conceptual-mediation model does not allow strict predictions about the nature of
concurrent colors. Similarly to memory colors, induced colors might be represented within
a conceptual network, or perceptually with corresponding activations in V4, depending on
the strength of synesthetic associations. The main diﬀerence is the route of activation of the
concurrent processing, which is fast and bottom-up in the cross-activation theory and
delayed and top-down in the conceptual-mediation model.
Predictions Regarding the Brain Structure and Function
The most prominent prediction that can be derived from the cross-activation theory is a
structural hyperconnectivity in the brain of synesthetes, speciﬁcally between the inducer-
processing and the concurrent-processing brain areas. That is, in grapheme–color
synesthesia, the letter-sensitive VWFA and the color-processing V4 should exhibit
structural diﬀerences between synesthetes and neurotypical individuals, especially enhanced
ﬁber tracks between those areas.
The conceptual-mediation model does not presuppose any structural brain diﬀerences
between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes. Widespread functional activity related to memory
retrieval is plausible in areas including associative visual cortex and the ATL. Such ﬁndings,
however, would not contradict the predictions from the cross-activation theory.
Predictions Regarding Inducer–Concurrent Mappings
According to the cross-activation theory, color coactivation relies on grapheme features, that
is, straight or curved lines with a given orientation. There is no reason to assume that these
features, or combinations thereof, consistently map to a speciﬁc color across synesthetes.
Conversely, the conceptual-mediation model states that inducer and concurrent are linked
in an object knowledge network. It is evident that these links must be acquired before any
synesthetic color experience can occur. Because children acquire literacy in a common
environment within a given culture, with similar toys and educational materials, it is fair
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to assume that some grapheme–color mappings should be highly prevalent across the
population of synesthetes. Another implication is that, after excessive training with
precolored graphemes, also nonsynesthetes should experience concurrent colors with
achromatic letters and numbers.
Empirical Findings
Findings Regarding the Inducer
Inducer features. Since graphemes are characterized by distinct visual features, it is plausible to
assume that grapheme–color synesthesia emerges during sensory processing of the visual
input (Brang et al., 2010). If this was the case, then changing the features of a grapheme
should also change the concurrently perceived color.
Indeed, case reports show that the font type and capitalization of the inducer can aﬀect the
hue or the vividness of the concurrent color (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001) and that
synesthetic colors can transfer to perceptually similar graphemes of a previously unknown
alphabet in synesthetes (Mroczko, Metzinger, Singer, & Nikolic´, 2009). Furthermore, it has
been reported in a large-scale study that similarly shaped graphemes induce similar
concurrent hues in individual synesthetes (Brang, Rouw, Ramachandran, & Coulson,
2011). The authors obtained color picks for a full set of graphemes and computed the
color distance for each possible pairing. The data were then correlated with measures
describing the perceived similarity between the relevant letters, as revealed by a diﬀerent
study (Courrieu, Farioli, & Grainger, 2004). These measures did not reﬂect the perceived
inducer similarity in the sample of synesthetes and did not rely on physical features of the
graphemes, like orientation or curvature. Thus, the data do not show a direct link between
physical inducer features and concurrent colors.
In a related study, Ramachandran and Marcus (2017) recently investigated form and color
binding for nongrapheme stimuli in synesthetes. After adaptation to alternating vertical and
horizontal stripes drawn in opponent colors, observers typically show an orientation-
contingent color aftereﬀect, the so-called McCollough eﬀect. The McCollough eﬀect was
found to persist longer in synesthetes compared to controls (see also Blake, Palmeri,
Marois, & Kim, 2005). This ﬁnding points to the existence of stronger form and color
connections in this group. However the authors do not exclude that the eﬀect was driven
by back projections from higher visual processing areas (Ramachandran & Marcus, 2017).
It should be noted that the reported concordances between grapheme shape and concurrent
color would not exclusively support a low-level explanation of synesthesia. It is also possible
that in the course of literacy acquisition, new graphemes are compared to those that have
already been learned and subsumed under the corresponding color association before their own
color variant is established. Similarly shaped graphemes might be associated with a similar
color until subtle diﬀerences in these graphemes are learned leading to stronger hue
diﬀerentiation. Indeed, developmental studies with synesthetes show that inducer–concurrent
pairings emerge progressively rather than instantaneously (Cohen Kadosh & Terhune, 2012;
Simner & Bain, 2013; Simner, Harrold, Creed, Monro, & Foulkes, 2009).
Inducer meaning. Most synesthetes report experiencing their concurrents regardless of the
presentation modality of the inducer (e.g., visual vs. auditory, Arnold, Wegener, Brown, &
Mattingley, 2012; Rich et al., 2005). In line with these ﬁndings, a number of studies have
revealed that not the physical form of the inducer but rather the semantic representation of
that grapheme is critical for the concurrent color activation (Chiou & Rich, 2014;
Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001; Rich et al., 2005). For example, it was found that
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ambiguous graphemes induce diﬀerent colors depending on the context in which they are
presented. For example, the grapheme ‘5’ is typically perceived as the letter ‘S’ or the digit
‘ﬁve’ when presented within ﬂanking letters or numbers, respectively. The induced colors are
diﬀerent in these situations although the physical form of the inducer is identical (Dixon,
Smilek, Duﬀy, Zanna, & Merikle, 2006).
Comparable results were obtained in a letter rotation task with graphemes that change
identity depending on their orientation (e.g., 6–9). Synesthetes reported changes of
synesthetic colors as the orientation of graphemes changed to an ambiguous form. Similarly,
graphemes morphing into each other induced changes in the synesthetic color corresponding to
the respective dominating letter percept (Bridgeman, Winter, & Tseng, 2010).
While Bridgeman et al. (2010) gathered subjective reports on the experienced color, Kim,
Blake, & Kim (2013) required a speeded categorization of either the synesthetic color or the
grapheme identity of these types of ambiguous characters (e.g., 6/9, M/W). An achromatic
grapheme was presented in one of the seven diﬀerent orientations, such that it would be
unequivocally identiﬁable at 0 and 180 (e.g., 6 or 9) and ambiguous at 90. The results
showed that the reaction speed not only for grapheme but also color identiﬁcation
parametrically varied with the stimulus orientation, with the highest reaction times for the
maximum angular deviation from an upright grapheme presentation.
If concurrent colors are bound to semantic grapheme representations, then physically
diﬀerent graphemes should activate the same color if they are mapped to the same
semantic representation. This idea was tested in a semantic learning task in which
synesthetes learned novel graphemes from an ancient writing system with a one-to-one
mapping to the letters of the Latin alphabet (Mroczko et al., 2009). In line with the
predictions, diﬀerent graphemes with the same lexical meaning activated the same color
concurrents. Importantly, synesthetes developed these new associations within minutes,
which cannot be explained by mere low-level perceptual learning that would only develop
over much longer time intervals (Ju¨rgens & Nikolic´, 2012).
Overall, the available studies show that the semantic or spatial context in which a
grapheme is presented modulates the induced color for synesthetes and that diﬀerent
graphemes with the same meaning can map to the same color. This supports the idea that
synesthetic colors are bound to high-level, nonperceptual representations of the grapheme. It
should be noted that Dixon et al. (2006) reported single case data, with unclear relevance at
the population level. The evaluation of the study results where rotated or morphed
graphemes were used is not straightforward either (Bridgeman et al., 2010; Kim et al.,
2013): Morphing and rotating the grapheme do not only aﬀect high-level grapheme
representations but also low-level feature representations. Thus, the results are also
compatible with the view that synesthesia relies on cross-activation during the perceptual
processing of the grapheme. Nevertheless, the ﬁnding that diﬀerent graphemes evoke the
same color if they have the same meaning is a convincing argument that semantic
representations are crucial for synesthesia, in line with a conceptual-mediation approach.
Conceptual inducers. The results of the studies reviewed in the previous sections suggest that
grapheme features activate semantic grapheme representations, which then coactivate colors.
Interestingly, a physical stimulus and sensory processing do not even seem necessary to
induce color in some number–color synesthetes (Dixon, Smilek, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2000;
Jansari, Spiller, & Redfern, 2006).
Dixon et al. (2000) investigated a single case of a digit–color synesthete that showed high
consistency on multiple color namings for each digit (1–9). In a synesthetic Stroop task with
color patches (baseline), and digits colored in their synesthetic color (congruent) or a diﬀerent
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color (incongruent), the synesthete showed signiﬁcantly slower reaction times naming the
print color on incongruent trials than on baseline or congruent trials. In an arithmetic
variation of the Stroop task, an arithmetic operation was followed by a color patch
congruent or incongruent to the synesthetic color for the calculation’s solution. Again, the
synesthete showed slower reaction times naming the patch color on incongruent trials. None
of these eﬀects was found in any of the eight nonsynesthetic control participants (Dixon et al.,
2000).
It should also be noted that there are some other subtypes of synesthesia in which the
inducer is a concept and not a physical stimulus. One such type is swimming-style–color
synesthesia (Nikolic´, Ju¨rgens, Rothen, Meier, & Mroczko, 2011; Rothen, Nikolic´, et al.,
2013), where color concurrents can be elicited by illustrations of swim strokes. Another
variant is the very common time unit synesthesia (e.g., days or months associated with
color). Because time units are not physical entities, and there is no sensory organ for time
perception, it must be the concept of the time unit that acts as the inducer (Mroczko-
Wasowicz & Nikolic´, 2014). Thus, synesthetic experiences do not appear to depend on the
sensory processing of the inducer, at least in some forms of synesthesia.
Inducer recognition. Object recognition depends on how the outcome of sensory processing is
selected for further action or cognition, that is, how attention is allocated to the outcome
(Robertson, 2003). If semantic grapheme representations are crucial in synesthesia, then
concurrent colors should emerge only when conscious access to a conceptual
representation of the grapheme is possible. When conscious access is limited, for example,
by masking of the grapheme or by detracting attention from the task, then no color
experience should occur.
This prediction was tested using a Stroop task with synesthetes and a control sample
(Mattingley, Rich, Yelland, & Bradshaw, 2001; see also Rich & Mattingley, 2003, 2010;
Rich et al., 2006; Sagiv, Heer, & Robertson, 2006). Both groups showed the expected
interference eﬀect in a standard Stroop task. In a synesthetic Stroop with synesthetically
congruent or incongruent graphemes as well as neutral symbols, only synesthetes showed a
signiﬁcant congruency eﬀect. In another task variant, an achromatic grapheme prime was
followed by a color patch which should be identiﬁed. The color of that patch was congruent,
incongruent, or neutral relative to the synesthetic color of the prime stimulus. The prime was
presented for either 500ms, 56ms, or 28ms in separate experiments. The conscious awareness
of the prime stimulus was tested by an additional condition with a grapheme identiﬁcation
task. Synesthetes only showed the typical Stroop interference when the prime was consciously
available (500ms). The results suggest that the synesthetic experience is contingent on
conscious access to the inducer representation (Mattingley et al., 2001). Later experiments
conﬁrmed that ﬁnding and showed smaller congruency eﬀects under high-attentional load
conditions during divided attention (Mattingley, Payne, & Rich, 2006; Mattingley et al.,
2001), if attention was distracted from an inducer during eye movements (Nijboer & der
Stigchel, 2009) or if the allocation of spatial attention to the inducer was disrupted by
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the parietal cortex (Esterman, Verstynen, Ivry,
& Robertson, 2006; Muggleton, Tsakanikos, Walsh, & Ward, 2007).
The role of attention was also shown with hierarchical stimuli where a global character is
made up of multiple smaller local characters (Navon, 1977). Depending on the attended
global or local level, synesthetes experience the synesthetic color of the grapheme
corresponding to that level (Palmeri, Blake, Marois, Flanery, & Whetsell, 2002). Utilizing
hierarchical stimuli, a Stroop-like color interference task has been carried out by Rich and
Mattingley (2003). The local and global graphemes were either consistent (e.g., large
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A composed of smaller letter As) or inconsistent (e.g., large A composed of small Bs), and
graphemes on the global and local levels were colored either congruently or incongruently
relative to their synesthetic color. Synesthetes’ reaction times were higher for incongruent
compared to congruent print and induced colors on one of the levels and were even higher if
the print colors on both levels were incongruent relative to the induced color. Nonsynesthetes
did not show any congruency eﬀect (Rich & Mattingley, 2003). In a further experiment,
participants were instructed to selectively attend to one level. The congruency eﬀect was
reduced for the unattended level, suggesting that lack of attention reduces the eﬀects of
synesthetic experience. However, the congruency eﬀect was not totally absent. The authors
argue that, similarly to attentional eﬀects in the classic Stroop task, semantic representations
of the synesthetic colors were activated less eﬃciently by the inducers (Rich & Mattingley,
2003). The changing color experience with hierarchical graphemes is consistent with the
ﬁndings using ambiguous letters and only conceptually triggered inducers described earlier,
in that the conceptual interpretation of the inducer is what elicits the concurrent, not the
physical presentation.
Findings Regarding the Concurrent Color
Synesthetic colors. If inducers directly coactivate color-sensitive neurons at an early processing
stage, then synesthetic colors should produce quantiﬁable eﬀects similar to real colors. Real–
colored target stimuli can easily be detected within large sets of achromatic distractor stimuli
in visual search tasks (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). While it is often argued that this color pop-
out eﬀect in visual search is also found in synesthetes (Palmeri et al., 2002; Ramachandran &
Hubbard, 2001), a closer look at the data shows a diﬀerence between the beneﬁt of
synesthesia in these search tasks and pop out (see also Chiou & Rich, 2014). Synesthetes
show higher accuracy in target detection than controls but do not show the lower reaction
times for pop out compared to non-pop out displays that are typically found in visual search
tasks with normal subjects (Rich & Karstoft, 2013; Wolfe, 1998).
Some basic phenomena in color vision that occur with real–colored stimuli can also be
produced with induced colors, like the Stroop eﬀect described earlier. However, it is not clear
at which processing stage the response conﬂict of the Stroop eﬀect arises. In a manipulation
of the synesthetic Stroop task, synesthetes showed an opponent color eﬀect (Nikolic´ et al.,
2007), in that the response conﬂict on incongruent trials was higher when the print color and
synesthetic color were opponent (e.g., red and green) compared to a reduced conﬂict for
colors of diﬀerent color channels (e.g., red and blue). The authors concluded that the
synesthetic Stroop eﬀect is based on early visual processing, especially since this
opponency eﬀect was not found in a semantic control task. This conclusion is at odds with
studies reviewed in the previous section which suggested that response conﬂicts between
induced and real colors rely on higher level representations of the inducer. However, it
cannot be excluded that color-opponent neurons were activated top-down, subsequent to a
high-level representation of the inducer and its color. Also, one might challenge the
interpretation of the semantic control task presented by Nikolic´ et al. (2007). As control
stimuli, they used a lemon (associated with yellow), a heart (associated with red), and a smiley
(no color information given). While the lemon has been shown to be a color diagnostic object
in studies of memory colors (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006), the color
associations for the two other shapes seem to be more vague. Both synesthetes and
nonsynesthetes showed overall shorter reaction times for naming the color of the semantic
stimuli than for graphemes, suggesting that the congruency eﬀect for semantic stimuli was
less due to response conﬂict on incongruent trials but rather due to facilitation on the
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congruent trials. Further, the observation of overall higher reaction times in the grapheme
experiment compared to the semantic experiment precludes the possibility that responses in
the former condition rely on initial color representations. It is plausible that the conﬂict arises
at a higher level semantic processing stage for the graphemes as well and is then passed down
to the color-opponent visual processing areas.
A separate line of investigation addresses whether the perceived color of a grapheme
depends on the sensory and temporal context of the presentation, as is the case for real
colors. For example, the sudden oﬀset of a chromatic stimulus after prolonged viewing
would produce an afterimage in the opponent color due to previous adaptation of color-
coding neurons. Synesthetic color experiences do not change to opponent colors at grapheme
oﬀsets though (Bridgeman et al., 2010). Similarly, the synesthetic color experience does not
depend on the brightness of the surround, as is the case with real colors (Erskine, Mattingley,
& Arnold, 2013; Hong & Blake, 2008). Thus, induced color experiences are dissociable from
regular color perception in synesthetes.
V4 activation. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has revealed that a variety of
brain sites are involved in synesthesia, including temporal association areas and parietal areas
(Laeng, Hugdahl, & Specht, 2011; Paulesu et al., 1995; Rich et al., 2006; Rouw, Scholte,
& Colizoli, 2011; Weiss, Zilles, & Fink, 2005). The role of color-processing area V4 in
synesthesia is still debated though. While some studies revealed higher blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) activation in V4 in response to inducers for synesthetes than
controls (e.g., Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005; Nunn et al., 2002; Sperling, Prvulovic,
Linden, Singer, & Stirn, 2006), other studies failed to ﬁnd V4 activation in synesthesia
(Hupe´, Bordier, & Dojat, 2012; Rich et al., 2006; Rouw & Scholte, 2007; Rouw et al.,
2011; Sinke et al., 2012). Among the latter studies, two utilized demanding spatial
localization or memory tasks (Hupe´ et al., 2012; Rich et al., 2006). Rouw and Scholte
(2007) contrasted BOLD responses to both weak and strong inducers with those of
noninducers, which possibly reduced the power of the analysis. Finally, Sinke et al.
(2012) collapsed colored and uncolored versions of letters and nonletters in their
analysis, so that V4 activation diﬀerences between the conditions were unlikely. Hupe´
and Dojat (2015) provide an in-depth review of neuroimaging studies on synesthesia.
Two problems they identiﬁed are the use of diﬀerent study designs and varying
localization methods for V4. Another problem, addressed by Gould van Praag,
Garﬁnkel, Ward, Bor, and Seth (2016), is the heterogeneity of synesthetic phenomena.
They measured the neuronal activity in response to silent letter identiﬁcation for inducing
letters and noninducing symbols in 20 synesthetes and matched controls. While no
signiﬁcant group diﬀerences in activation were found in color-selective areas, BOLD
responses correlated positively with scores in localization and automaticity factors of
the Colored Letters and Numbers questionnaire (Rothen, Tsakanikos, Meier, & Ward,
2013). Synesthetes who experience their concurrent at a speciﬁc location showed stronger
activity in response to inducing stimuli in their individual color-selective areas on both
hemispheres. If the concurrent experience arises more automatically, synesthetes show
higher activity in their left hemispheric color areas (Gould van Praag et al., 2016).
This ﬁnding is in line with the assumption of a diﬀerent activation extent within the
color network dependent on the strength of the synesthetic association made by the
conceptual-mediation model.
Time course of color coactivation. The time course of color coactivation gives further information
on the role of low- and high-level mechanisms in grapheme–color synesthesia. Electro- and
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magnetoencephalography (EEG/MEG) provide an appropriate temporal resolution for
that purpose.
Brang, Edwards, Ramachandran, & Coulson (2008) and Brang, Kanai, Ramachandran, &
Coulson (2011) measured event-related potentials (ERPs) in synesthetes and controls while
presenting color priming sentences that ended with a color word, a color inducing grapheme,
or a color patch. These could be either congruent or incongruent to the context of the
sentence. ERP responses for color terms and color patches were similar in both groups
with a stronger N400 component on incongruent trials. The same eﬀect was found for
inducers in synesthetes but not in controls. More interestingly in the current context, the
N1/P2 complex of the ERP showed a negative shift for color congruent compared to
incongruent inducers in synesthetes starting 100ms after stimulus onset. The authors take
this ﬁnding as support for a special neuroanatomy in synesthetes and for the perceptual
nature of grapheme–color synesthesia.
The diﬀerences between synesthetes and controls, however, might also be attributable to
the control subjects’ ignorance of the color-related aspects of the tested graphemes. Brang,
Kanai, et al. (2011), therefore, extended their previous results by testing four diﬀerent control
groups. Naive controls and trained controls, who learned 10 grapheme–color pairings from
their matched synesthetes prior to the EEG experiment, were tested as described earlier.
Another control group viewed objectively chromatic graphemes in the grapheme
condition. The fourth group was also trained but were not presented with color word or
patch endings, only the trained achromatic graphemes, which they were explicitly instructed
to visualize to account for anticipatory eﬀects. As in their previous study, sentences ending
with a color term or patch did not produce any group diﬀerences. The N1 component was
more negative in response to congruent graphemes compared to incongruent ones in
synesthetes. Controls viewing chromatic graphemes also showed this trend, suggesting that
this component reﬂects, indeed, processing of colored shapes regardless of whether the color
is synesthetic or real. The congruency eﬀect in the P2 component was observed in synesthetes
only. The N400 showed a congruency eﬀect in synesthetes and controls viewing real–colored
graphemes as well as controls visualizing the anticipated grapheme. Controls trained on
synesthesia-like associations also showed a trend for more negative N400 on incongruent
trials. In conclusion, early components of a congruency eﬀect in the ERP signal occurred with
synesthetic color in synesthetes and real color in controls, while the later component of
context sensitivity was also visible in trained controls.
Brang et al. (2010) used MEG to assess the time course of neural activity in response to
synesthetic stimulation in two distinct cortical regions, V4 and the posterior temporal
grapheme area (PTGA). These regions of interest (ROIs) were deﬁned a priori by
measuring the MEG responses to red squares (V4) and colored graphemes (PTGA) in the
posterior temporal lobe. In the main task, achromatic graphemes and nongraphemic stimuli
were presented in an upright or italic discrimination task. Both synesthetes and
nonsynesthetes showed activation in response to achromatic graphemes in PTGA, while
only synesthetes showed signiﬁcant activation in V4. Furthermore, the V4 activation
occurred only about 5ms after the activation in PTGA, suggesting a direct connection of
these two ROIs in synesthetes. The early time point suggests a response to graphemic features
before the letter is identiﬁed as a whole, in line with the cross-activation theory. It would be
interesting to examine possible activations in response to fake letters with similar features.
The results for the nongraphemic stimuli are not presented by Brang et al. (2010). It could be
argued that the PTGA, which was deﬁned using colored graphemes, is not an exact reﬂection
of pure grapheme processing. However, the area was deﬁned excluding V4 to control for
color-processing inﬂuences. The achromatic graphemes in the main task also elicited similar
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activation in this area in controls although it was slightly delayed (115–119ms in controls,
105–109ms in synesthetes). A comparison of the achromatic grapheme processing in
synesthetes and the colored grapheme processing in controls would be interesting at this
point. Still, this ﬁnding is promising in regard to the cross-activation theory. A bigger
sample size (here 4 per group) with varying phenomenology in the synesthetic experience
would be needed for conﬁrmation.
Findings Regarding Brain Structure and Function
Neuroanatomy. The central tenet of the cross-activation theory is that activity in V4 is induced
by structural connections from grapheme-processing areas like VWFA. The ﬁrst direct proof
of enhanced structural connectivity in synesthetes was found by Rouw and Scholte (2007)
using diﬀusion tensor imaging. With this technique, microstructural diﬀerences can be
analyzed together with the tractography of neural ﬁbers. Measuring the fractional
anisotropy (FA) as an indicator of coherent white matter in 18 grapheme–color
synesthetes plus matched controls, they found increased connectivity in the right inferior
temporal cortex but also the left superior parietal and the superior frontal cortex of
synesthetes. While promising, this ﬁnding could not be replicated to date (Hupe´ et al.,
2012; Ja¨ncke, Beeli, Eulig, & Ha¨nggi, 2009). Whitaker et al. (2014) found overall decreased
FA and increased perpendicular diﬀusivity in synesthetes compared to nonsynesthetes. This
ﬁnding was ascribed to more crossing pathways in the brain of synesthetes. Within
synesthetes, the microstructural measurements correlated with scores on the Vividness of
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973), as synesthetes with very vivid imagery
showed the lowest FA values (Whitaker et al., 2014). Note, however, that their study was
criticized for an insuﬃcient measuring technique (six directions, 1.5 Tesla, cluster extent
statistics; see also Hupe´ & Dojat, 2015).
Another approach to study structural brain anatomy is measuring gray matter volume
with voxel-based morphometry (VBM). A few of the carried out studies have reported
increased gray matter volume in synesthetes’ color-processing areas (Banissy et al., 2012;
Ja¨ncke et al., 2009; Weiss & Fink, 2009; see Hupe´ & Dojat, 2015; Janik McErlean &
Banissy, 2017 for overview). Notably, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in cortical
density between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes on a whole-brain analysis level but only in
a priori deﬁned ROIs (atlas based in Weiss & Fink, 2009 using their coordinates in Banissy
et al., 2012). A study by Rouw and Scholte (2010) revealed distinct structural diﬀerences for
synesthetes who experience the synesthetic color in the outside world (so-called projectors,
increased gray matter volume in V1) and for those who experience the concurrent internally
(associators, increased gray matter volume in hippocampus). Both types of synesthetes had
increased gray matter volume in the superior parietal cortex.
Neurophysiology. While not stated explicitly in the cross-activation theory, it is straightforward
to assume that increased structural connectivity aﬀects the excitability of the connected
cortices (Biane, Scanziani, Tuszynski, & Conner, 2015). Indeed, there is evidence for an
increased excitability of the primary visual cortex in synesthetes compared to controls.
Barnett et al. (2008) conducted an ERP study with Gabor patches that did not induce
color experiences for any participant. Still, amplitudes of the C1 component (<90ms) were
higher for synesthetes compared to controls for a subset of stimuli with high spatial
frequencies. In line with this ﬁnding, a TMS study revealed that the minimum stimulation
intensity that was necessary to produce a phosphene sensation was three times lower in
synesthetes compared to controls (Terhune, Tai, Cowey, Popescu, & Cohen Kadosh,
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2011). The diﬀerence was speciﬁc for the visual cortex and did not occur in a motor threshold
control condition. Thus, synesthetes exhibit a hyperexcitability of the visual cortex compared
to controls.
In this context, it is remarkable that synesthetes and controls show diﬀerences in visual
perception, beyond grapheme and inducer processing. Synesthetes who experience color
concurrents also exhibited a superior performance compared to controls in a color
discrimination task (Banissy et al., 2013; Banissy, Walsh, & Ward, 2009). Moreover, in a
reaction time experiment with redundant visual and auditory stimuli, synesthetes showed
stronger multimodal integration than controls, that is, a larger reaction time advantage
relative to unimodal conditions than would be expected from processing two signals
separately (Brang, Williams, & Ramachandran, 2012). These ﬁndings suggest that
diﬀerences between synesthetes and controls are not conﬁned to grapheme representations
and associated colors. Rather, the synesthetic experience appears to be only one symptom of
a more general diﬀerence in brain structure and function.
Anterior temporal lobe. While activation in visual association areas in the posterior occipito-
temporal cortex has been found in some studies on synesthesia (see Rouw et al., 2011 for
overview), no direct link between the ATL and synesthesia has been identiﬁed yet. The ATL
lies in a methodologically diﬃcult area of the brain to examine with MRI, as described by
Chiou and Rich (2014). Lately, more research has been published regarding the ATL and its
role in object knowledge in nonsynesthetes (Chiou & Lambon Ralph, 2016, 2017; Chiou,
Sowman, Etchell, & Rich, 2014; Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2015). Hence, we are
looking forward to the investigation of the ATL in the context of synesthesia.
Findings Regarding Inducer–Concurrent Mappings
Mappings based on color-diagnostic words. A growing body of work indicates that the mapping of
the inducers to their concurrents is not random in the synesthetic population. Rich et al.
(2005) found patterns of grapheme–color pairings consistent over a large group of
synesthetes. Letters that are the ﬁrst letter of a color word (e.g., ‘R’ for ‘red’ or ‘Y’ for
‘yellow’) are often associated with this hue. Another pattern could be found on a more
semantic level between the letters ‘D’ and brown, ‘A’ and red and ‘J’ and orange. While
these letters have no phonetic link to their associated colors, semantic connections are
possible, for example, the letter ‘D’ could be learned with the word ‘dog’ and dogs are
often depicted with brown fur (Rich et al., 2005). The color red is typically associated with
warning, as could the letter ‘A’ for attention. Another possible semantic connection could be
a red apple, and ‘J’ might be linked to orange via the word ‘juice’. Furthermore, Simner et al.
(2005) also compared a sample of English-speaking controls and a sample of German-
speaking controls. Both groups chose similar grapheme–color pairings for colors with
similar names in both languages (e.g., ‘White’ and ‘weiss’, ‘blue’ and ‘blau’) but assigned
diﬀerent colors to some letters depending on their native language (e.g., ‘purple’ in English
was associated with ‘P’, while the corresponding German ‘lila’ was associated with ‘L’;
Simner et al., 2005).
Interestingly, these patterns can also be seen in nonsynesthetes when asked about
grapheme–color associations (Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2005; Spector & Maurer,
2011). In the questionnaire study by Simner et al. (2005), nonsynesthetic controls stated
color associations for letters. Consistent grapheme–color pairings were found for 16 letters
regardless of a forced or free choice instruction. The free choice group also selected 13
grapheme–color matches that were similar to the synesthetes’ choices (16 overlapping
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grapheme–color pairings when comparing forced choice controls and synesthetes). However,
the synesthetes used more detailed color terms than the control participants either due to a
more extensive color vocabulary or because of their more vivid experience of the grapheme–
color association (Simner et al., 2005). A relationship between grapheme frequency and
frequency of color terms could only be found for synesthetes, while nonsynesthetes tended
to pick typical colors at the beginning of the grapheme presentation session. This might
reﬂect a diﬀerent mechanism underlying the pairing of graphemes and colors in
synesthetes and nonsynesthetes, even though an association is present in both groups
(Simner et al., 2005).
Mappings based on exposition to objects. Synesthesia arises in childhood when literacy is
acquired (Ward, 2013). It thus seems likely that the mappings between the inducers and
the concurrents rely on coherent correspondences as experienced in childhood. Witthoft
and Winawer (2006) describe a single case of a grapheme–color synesthete whose
grapheme–color mappings closely resembled a set of colored refrigerator magnets that
were popular during the synesthete’s childhood. In later studies that speciﬁc mapping
was also found in larger samples of synesthetes, indicating that the letter–color
associations reﬂect early learning (Witthoft & Winawer, 2013; Witthoft, Winawer, &
Eagleman, 2015). It is important to note that early childhood experiences are highly
individual and do not necessarily correspond to typical environmental regularities (Yon
& Press, 2014). Multiple sources may inﬂuence the acquisition and modiﬁcation of
associations over an extended period of time, making it challenging to trace back any
inducer–concurrent correspondence to a single origin (Hupe´ & Dojat, 2015; Simner,
2012a, 2012b; Yon & Press, 2014). For example, in a large-scale survey study, Rich
et al. (2005) could not ﬁnd school supplies that matched the common synesthetic
mappings.
Trained mappings in nonsynesthetes. If grapheme–color mappings in synesthetes rely on learning,
then it should be possible to establish similar mappings in nonsynesthetes. Indeed, various
studies have demonstrated successful training of grapheme–color associations in
neurotypicals (Bor, Rothen, Schwartzman, Clayton, & Seth, 2014; Colizoli, Murre, &
Rouw, 2012, 2014; Colizoli et al., 2016; Meier & Rothen, 2009; Rothen, Schwartzman,
Bor, & Seth, 2018; Rothen, Wantz, & Meier, 2011).
Meier and Rothen (2009) reported that nonsynesthetes showed a synesthetic Stroop eﬀect
after training grapheme–color associations. In an extension of this study, two training
conditions were compared (Rothen et al., 2011): a nonadaptive training that consisted of a
congruent or incongruent decision task with regard to the predeﬁned associations and an
adaptive task in which the right color had to be chosen among four color patches presented
together with a black digit. After feedback, participants had to adjust the luminance of the
congruently colored digit. Both trainings consisted of 10 sessions on consecutive days. Both
training programs led to a signiﬁcant enhancement of a digit–color priming eﬀect (i.e., higher
reaction time if an achromatic digit prime was congruent to the target color), indicating that
trained inducers can also trigger automatic color perception (Meier & Rothen, 2009; Rothen
et al., 2011). However, this eﬀect is not entirely convincing, as the authors did not
corroborate these psychophysical ﬁndings with a neuroimaging study. In the study by
Brang, Kanai, et al. (2011) described in Section ‘‘Findings Regarding the Concurrent
Color,’’ the trained control groups showed an expectancy eﬀect in the N400 ERP
component but not the diﬀerences in earlier components speciﬁc to synesthetes.
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Colizoli et al. (2012, 2014) showed that also reading books with systematically colored
letters led to implicit grapheme–color associations. After reading for 2 to 4 weeks,
participants showed a signiﬁcant congruency eﬀect in a synesthetic Stroop task for their
trained associations. These results were conﬁrmed in a more recent study (Colizoli et al.,
2016) in which also training-related neuronal activation was measured using fMRI.
A localizer for VWFA and retinotopic mapping for V1 to V4 were acquired before the
training. After the training, participants passively viewed trained, untrained, and colored
untrained letters in a blocked design (synesthetic color localizer). All predeﬁned areas
showed higher activity for colored letters than for both achromatic sets.
Trained graphemes led to more negative activation than untrained (achromatic)
graphemes, especially in V1, V2, and V3. The strength of this deactivation did not
correlate with the strength of the Stroop eﬀect, though there was a slight trend.
The decreased V4 activity for trained compared to untrained graphemes correlated with
subjective ratings of associative color experiences. This was evaluated using a projector–
associator questionnaire that assesses the characteristics of concurrent color experiences in
synesthetes on a scale ranging from seeing the color in the outside world (projectors) to
having a strong inner feeling of the grapheme–color association (associators; Rouw &
Scholte, 2007). Participants rated their trained association as neutral (if they disagreed
with all questions) or toward the associator-type. Since the training was an implicit
associative learning task, it seems reasonable that participants would describe their
experience in this way. The diﬀerences in these learned synesthesia-like experiences seem to
be reﬂected in V4 activation (Colizoli et al., 2016).
There have also been studies with more extensive training. A 9-week long program
consisting of various adaptive tasks induced not only a synesthetic Stroop eﬀect but
also self-reported synesthesia-like experiences for a short period of time (Bor et al.,
2014). A recent study by Rothen et al. (2018) examined the consequences of thorough
overtraining on self-reported ratings and behavioral as well as neuronal excitability
measures. Sixty-minute training sessions on 13 letter–color associations were conducted
on 5 days per week for 5 weeks. Participants stayed naive to the study goals and were only
asked about color associations after all behavioral and neural data acquisition was
completed. In line with the self-reported phenomenology similar to that of synesthetes
(i.e., experiencing color induced by achromatic graphemes without eﬀort), the grapheme–
color associations were also evident on a behavioral level as measured by a grapheme–
color consistency test (Eagleman et al., 2007, described in ‘‘Introduction’’ section) and a
synesthetic Stroop task. To investigate the cortical changes due to training, phosphene and
motor thresholds were determined using TMS as had been previously carried out with
synesthetes (Terhune et al., 2011, see ‘‘Findings Regarding Brain Structure and Function’’
section). Indeed, the extensive training of grapheme–color associations led to a signiﬁcant
reduction in the phosphene threshold, indicating increased cortical excitability for colors
comparable to that of genuine synesthetes. As a further manifestation of
neurophysiological changes, participants showed enhanced visual evoked potentials
when presented with checkerboards after the training. Again, this shows enhanced
visual perceptual processing similar to that of genuine synesthetes (Barnett et al., 2008,
see ‘‘Findings Regarding Brain Structure and Function’’ section). Extensive training of
letter–symbol associations led to a congruency eﬀect in a Stroop-like priming test with
congruent or incongruent symbols but not to cortical changes or synesthesia-like
phenomenology. Repeated testing in a control group without training did not provoke
any of these eﬀects.
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Conclusions
In this review, we examined two current theories of grapheme–color synesthesia. The cross-
activation theory by Hubbard and Ramachandran (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001;
Hubbard, Brang & Ramachandran, 2011) focuses on atypical perceptual processing in
synesthetes, especially a direct coactivation of color-processing neurons in V4 by visual
features of graphemes enabled by a structural hyperconnectivity in the brain of
synesthetes. On the opposite, the conceptual-mediation model by Chiou and Rich (2014)
proposes that conceptual representations of graphemes comprise enhanced color
associations in synesthetes and, depending on how far the activation spreads within the
semantic network (i.e., reaching high- or low-level color representations), lead to the
experience of color with varying strength.
Based on studies focusing on properties of the inducer, we found more evidence for
conceptual, as opposed to featural, inducer properties inﬂuencing the perception of a
concurrent color. While similar features in graphemic shapes were found to be
accompanied by similar concurrent colors, the ﬁnding could be explained both by
coactivation (Brang, Rouw, et al., 2011) or semantic learning (Ju¨rgens & Nikolic´, 2012).
Notably, the similarity of graphemes in the study by Brang, Rouw, et al. (2011) was not
assessed based on physical features but on perceived resemblance which might also
encompass conceptual similarities. The ﬁndings supporting that the perception of the
inducer is modulated by its context and meaning are not free of methodological problems
either. Morphing and rotating graphemes, as done by Bridgeman et al. (2010) and Kim et al.
(2013), aﬀect not only the identiﬁcation of a letter but also its visual appearance, that is, its
features. Dixon et al. (2006) conducted a well-controlled experiment with context modulation
but only report results for a single case. Several experiments revealed that low levels of
attention to the inducer produce low levels of interference in synesthetic Stroop tasks.
However, it was not fully abolished in most cases. Thus, attention is presumably not
necessary for the synesthetic experience but modulates the strength of the concurrent color
experience. Most convincing are the ﬁndings of diﬀerent inducers evoking the same color
when they have the same meaning (Mroczko et al., 2009) and experiences of synesthesia
induced by concepts. Despite some methodological shortcomings, behavioral studies using
manipulations of the inducer seem to be in agreement with the idea that the conscious
recognition and conceptual interpretation of the inducer are essential for the emergence of
concurrent colors, as proposed by the conceptual-mediation model.
Regarding the concurrent color, neither behavioral nor fMRI data have yet provided
clear evidence for or against either of the discussed theories. Concurrent colors are not
identical to real colors, as one would assume if their processing is activated early on. In
that case, they would induce comparable color aftereﬀects or pop-out eﬀects in visual
search tasks. Activity in the color-sensitive area V4 during concurrent color experiences
has been shown in some but not all fMRI studies. Easy tasks like font discrimination or
passive viewing of graphemes seem to promote positive results (Hubbard &
Ramachandran, 2005; Sperling et al., 2006). In any case, neural activity in V4 for
inducers is compatible with both models (bottom-up in the cross-activation theory, but
top-down in the conceptual-mediation model). Analyses of the time course of inducer
processing by means of EEG and MEG provide strong evidence for atypical perceptual
processing in synesthetes. Especially, the reported early coactivation of V4 measuring MEG
source activity during inducer processing is in line with the predictions of the cross-
activation theory (Brang et al., 2010). It can be objected that MEG source
reconstructions lack the spatial resolution that would be necessary to distinguish between
activity in the neighboring VWFA and V4 sites (Krishnaswamy et al., 2017). However,
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together with the results of the above reviewed fMRI studies, this ﬁnding favors a
perceptual explanation for synesthesia. In sum, behavioral ﬁndings suggest that
synesthetic colors are diﬀerent from real colors, but selected fMRI studies have revealed
increased BOLD responses in color-sensitive area V4 during inducer processing, likely due
to early coactivation as revealed by EEG/MEG studies.
The examination of structural diﬀerences between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes revealed
increased FA in the right inferior temporal cortex in one study (Rouw & Scholte, 2007) and
decreased FA in the whole brain in another study (Whitaker et al., 2014). VBM revealed
increased gray matter volume in color-sensitive areas in synesthetes (Banissy et al., 2012;
Ja¨ncke et al., 2009; Weiss & Fink, 2009). However, not all studies researching structural
diﬀerences in synesthetes are in agreement with these ﬁndings (Hupe´ & Dojat, 2015).
The probably small diﬀerences might be hard to detect with current methods in DWI and
VBM. Hence, further research is needed to replicate these promising ﬁndings of atypical
brain anatomy. Synesthetes also show structural diﬀerences in other areas, such as
increased FA values in the parietal cortex (Rouw & Scholte, 2007) and increased gray
matter volume in the hippocampus (Rouw & Scholte, 2010). The former is in line with the
revised cross-activation theory, which suggests enhanced binding in the parietal cortex as one
supporting mechanism in synesthesia. Increased hippocampus size might hint at an increased
memory capacity also in line with the conceptual-mediation model. Besides structural
diﬀerences, hyperexcitability of the visual cortex in response to nonsynesthetic stimuli has
been found using EEG (Barnett et al., 2008) and TMS (Terhune et al., 2011). Together with
behavioral evidence of enhanced visual perception (Banissy et al., 2009) and multisensory
integration (Brang et al., 2012) in synesthetes, this hints at a more general altered brain
function in this population. Enhanced microstructure and excitability in synesthetes overall
support the cross-activation theory. The involvement of the ATL has not been suﬃciently
investigated yet.
Examination of both synesthetes’ and nonsynesthetes’ grapheme–color pairings shows
that the mapping of colors to inducers is not random but builds on previous experiences
with color-diagnostic words or objects. Various semantic associations between colors and
their inducing graphemes have been identiﬁed (Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2005).
Moreover, nonsynesthetes seem to exhibit similar grapheme–color associations even
though these do not lead to a conscious synesthetic experience (Rich et al., 2005; Spector
& Maurer, 2011). Training programs have been shown to eﬀectively induce synesthesia-like
behavior, for example, the congruency eﬀect, and even changes in neuronal activity in
nonsynesthetes (Bor et al., 2014; Colizoli et al., 2012, 2014, 2016; Meier & Rothen, 2009;
Rothen et al., 2011, 2018). However, the long-term training eﬀects need to be evaluated
further, as self-report in one study indicated that these were not permanent (Rothen et al.,
2011). Since synesthetes experience their concurrents automatically since childhood, they are
essentially rehearsing their color associations in a lifelong training. Hence, it is plausible that
even training sessions on several consecutive days may be insuﬃcient to mimic synesthesia to
its full extent. An intensive training regime over several weeks also induced cortical changes
(Rothen et al., 2018), suggesting that a large amount of exposure to and active engagement
with the grapheme–color associations could account for the neuronal diﬀerences seen in
synesthetes. This is in line with the conceptual-mediation model, as it states that the
strength of the synesthetic experience depends on the strength of the associations in
the memory network.
Overall, the following picture emerges: The prevailing ﬁndings regarding the properties of
the inducer and the inducer–concurrent mappings broadly support the conceptual-mediation
model. On the other hand, the available ﬁndings in relation to concurrent colors and brain
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structure support the cross-activation model. Given that the empirical evidence does not
favor one or the other theory, but rather speciﬁc predictions thereof, we will try to oﬀer
an integrative view on the data.
There seem to be individuals whose neural endowment makes them prone to synesthetic
experiences. They are characterized by highly excitable and hyperconnected brains. From a
computational point of view, high connectivity allows for high degrees of freedom in cross-
modal representations (Bavelier & Neville, 2002). Moreover, a high excitability promotes
high learning rates and thus functional plasticity (Holtmaat & Caroni, 2016). These neural
characteristics would also promote a cross-modal mixing of color and shape information, as
in grapheme–color synesthesia. Although synesthetes’ color and letter associations can
already be observed in early childhood, at the age of 6 (Simner et al., 2009), the
consistency of the letter–color mappings increases with age. This supports the idea that
grapheme–color synesthesia results from an interaction of neurostructural and
environmental (i.e., learning) factors. While structural connections and direct cross-
activation might enable the initial link between inducers and concurrents, these
associations are stored and reinforced in a conceptual knowledge network. Consequently,
the activation of the concept alone would suﬃce for a concurrent color experience. We have
argued in a previous work that color coactivation may then become increasingly automatic
due to long-term potentiation (Volberg et al., 2013). As a result, an inducer would evoke
activity in color-sensitive areas early during processing.
Since nonsynesthetes also exhibit color associations for graphemes (Spector & Maurer,
2011; Simner et al., 2005), it can be argued that a color-link in the semantic network is not
exclusive to synesthetes. Indeed, the synesthetic condition has been considered as an extreme
along a continuum of cross-sensory associations of diﬀerent intensities (Simner, 2012a,
2012b). It is reasonable to assume that the conceptual knowledge of graphemes is alike in
synesthetes and nonsynesthetes with a common language. Conceptual knowledge on letter
colors would be stored in the same network as previous perceptual color experiences with
that letter. With age, the associated color might then converge more and more to the
canonical hue found in the population.
To date, both the cross-activation and conceptual-mediation theories have their eligibility.
It remains to be investigated which of the proposed mechanisms are crucial for the
synesthetic experience. Research on grapheme–color synesthesia is deeply rooted in visual
neuroscience and theories of multisensory perception (Brang et al., 2010; Brang, Kanai, et al.,
2011; Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) and less in memory research or color vision. In the
last section, we want to consider how the idea of synesthesia as a form of object knowledge
could be investigated applying current paradigms used in memory color research.
Future Directions
In a recent study with synesthetes and controls, Volberg, Chockley, and Greenlee (2017)
found a pattern of EEG theta activity speciﬁc to synesthetes during the processing of
inducing and noninducing graphemes. Since the graphemes were presented as distractors
within an orientation judgement paradigm and so were fully irrelevant to the task, this
suggests that graphemes that would later induce colors are automatically selected and
processed in synesthetes. The automated processing of graphemes is possibly an important
clue to understand grapheme–color synesthesia. The enhanced encoding was attributed to
increased grapheme expertise (Volberg et al., 2017). Expertise implies an increased scrutiny
and preference for the inducers. Indeed, synesthetes show signiﬁcantly more pronounced
interest in literature and language than nonsynesthetes (Rich et al., 2005). Furthermore,
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synesthetes exhibit a distinct cognitive style favoring verbal and vivid imagery (Meier &
Rothen, 2013). This might be linked to synesthetes’ higher scores than controls’ in verbal
originality, vocabulary, and usage of mental imagery (Chun & Hupe´, 2016). Of course, it
remains to be determined whether these traits are a consequence of the synesthetic experience.
However, in light of the ﬁndings reviewed earlier, it seems fair to assume that these traits
make synesthetes more prone to building extensive association networks involving graphemes
and promote the development of synesthesia.
If synesthetic mappings rely on abstract representations in an association network, the
colors should be experienced whenever a grapheme triggers the retrieval of the color from
memory. To investigate the relationship between synesthesia and memory for colors, Arnold
et al. (2012) compared the matching precision of synesthetic colors with real and memorized
colors in synesthetes who only experience color when seeing (but not when hearing) a
grapheme. Both synesthetes and control participants performed better during real color
perception, than during recollection, in line with ﬁndings for memorized color in
nonsynesthetes (Knill & Richards, 1996). Moreover, synesthetes were just as precise when
recalling their synesthetic colors as during the concurrent perception. This suggests that
synesthetic color experiences may involve a retrieval of color information from memory,
triggered by the grapheme as a retrieval cue.
Associations between objects and colors are not limited to grapheme processing in synesthetes
but occur commonly in the normal population. The typical color of an object that is
learned through experience is referred to as a memory color (Bartleson, 1960; Hering, 1920;
Olkkonen, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Witzel, Valkova, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2011).
These memory colors have an impact on our real-world perception. Achromatic pictures of
objects are perceived as slightly colored in the objects typical colors, as shown by Hansen et al.
(2006), Olkkonen et al. (2008), and Witzel (2016). This eﬀect of object knowledge on color
perception is called the memory color eﬀect. Hansen et al. (2006) implemented a method to
determine how much tint of the opponent color an achromatic image needs to cancel out the
object’s memory color. In an achromatic color adjustment task, participants adjusted the color
of natural objects (fruits) to neutral gray. However, participants overcompensated by adjusting
the color of the object to be slightly tinted in the opponent color instead of neutral. It appears
that a slight opponent color hue is necessary to cancel out the memory color for this object in
order for it to appear gray. For example, an image of a banana was only perceived to be gray
when it was actually adjusted to have a slightly blue color. The memory color eﬀect is still
evident under diﬀerent illumination conditions (Olkkonen et al., 2008). Witzel et al. (2011)
further investigated the memory color eﬀect for artiﬁcial objects. They ﬁrst measured the
color diagnosticity for each object (i.e., how much an object is linked to a typical color) and
then conducted an achromatic color-adjustment task. In line with ﬁndings for natural objects,
knowledge about the typical color inﬂuenced the color appearance (Witzel et al., 2011).
The memory color eﬀect depends on the degree of familiarity with an object. It occurs only
for highly familiar objects, for example, brand logos with high compared to low number of
stores (Kimura et al., 2013). Taking into consideration these current ﬁndings on memory colors,
we deem further research on its role in synesthesia necessary. The fact that knowledge about the
typical color of an object modulates how the object is perceived, especially in highly familiar
objects (like graphemes are for synesthetes), has not yet been appropriately examined in
synesthesia research.
Acting on the assumption that the extent of trait expression exhibited by synesthetes and
nonsynesthetes form a continuum (Simner, 2012a, 2012b), the strength of the memory color
eﬀect could provide a measure of the strength of the inducer–concurrent association with a
cutoﬀ diﬀerentiating between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes. The achromatic adjustment
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task (Hansen et al., 2006) is an elaborate paradigm. As an alternative, Witzel (2016) proposed
a forced choice task to show the memory color eﬀect in a large sample group. He conducted a
series of online surveys which included displays of a pair of bananas or a pair of disks, one of
them in the neutral background gray and the other in a slightly bluish tint. Participants had
to decide which one of the pair was purely gray. Consistent with his hypothesis, participants
picked the bluish banana signiﬁcantly more often than the neutral gray banana. This eﬀect
was not signiﬁcant for the disks.
We suggest that the display task by Witzel (2016) might be adapted to examine synesthetic
colors by replacing the bananas with inducers and the disks with noninducing control stimuli.
The coloring of the stimuli would be purely gray or with a slight tint in the opponent color of
the individual concurrent color for each tested inducer. According to the memory color eﬀect,
synesthetes should pick the colored stimuli over the natural gray ones on inducer trials. Such
experiments could provide support for the idea that grapheme–color synesthesia is related to
the formation of memory colors.
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